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ABSTRACT 
Trust plays a critical role in communications, strength of 
relationships, and information processing at the individual 
and group levels. Cognitive social simulations show promise 
in providing an experimental platform for the examination of 
social phenomena such as trust formation. This work is a 
novel attempt at trust representation in a cognitive social 
simulation using reinforcement learning algorithms.  Initial 
algorithm development was completed within a standalone 
social network simulation and tested using a public 
commodity game.  Evaluation of the contributions and 
dividends within the public commodity game shows that many 
of the expected behaviors of human trust formation are 
present.  Initial results show that reinforcement learning 
can accurately capture the core essentials of human trust 
formation.  Following standalone testing, the trust 
algorithm was imported into the Cultural Geography model for 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF MODELING TRUST ...........1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT ..................................1 
B. EXPLORING THE PROBLEM ..............................3 
C. METHODOLOGY ........................................7 
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION .........................9 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST ...............................9 
1. Agent Communications and Trust ...............10 
2.  The Cultural Geography Model .................12 
3.  The Public Commodity and Economic Games of 
Trust ........................................15 
4. Getting Back to the Issue of Trust ...........18 
B.  MACHINE LEARNING ..................................20 
1. Reinforcement Learning .......................20 
2.  Q-Learning Using Boltzmann Selection .........21 
C.  SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS ...........................25 
III. THE TRUST ALGORITHM IN DETAIL ..........................29 
A.  REINFORCEMENT LEARNING AS A TOOL TO DRIVE DYNAMIC 
SOCIAL NETWORKS ...................................29 
B.  ADDING COMMUNICATIONS AND TRUST TO THE SOCIAL 
NETWORK ...........................................39 
C. TUNING THE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING PARAMETERS ......46 
IV. APPLICATION TO CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY ......................53 
A.  THE TRUST MODEL WITHIN CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY .........54 
B.  ATTEMPTING TO PLAY PUBLIC COMMODITY GAMES IN 
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY ................................56 
C.  DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ................57 
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS ......................................59 
A.  FUTURE TESTING WITH TRUST GAMES ...................59 
B.  GENETIC ALGORITHMS FOR IN-SITU MODIFCATION OF 
AGENT LEARNING ....................................60 
C.  SITUATION IDENTIFICATION AND LAYERED APPROACH TO 
TRUST .............................................60 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................69 
 
 viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. A General Agent Model...........................10 
Figure 2. General Trust/Communication Model...............11 
Figure 3. Q-Learning Reinforcement Equation...............21 
Figure 4. Boltzmann (Soft-Max) Selection Probability......22 
Figure 5. Overview of the Q-Learning Cycle................24 
Figure 6. Degree Centrality Formulae......................26 
Figure 7. Betweenness-Centrality Formulae.................27 
Figure 8. Closeness-Centrality Formulae...................28 
Figure 9. Sample Homophily Calculation....................32 
Figure 10. Basic Reward Calculation........................33 
Figure 11. Highly Centralized Social Network...............34 
Figure 12. An Example of a clique of three agents  or 3-
clique..........................................36 
Figure 13. Secondary Rewards in the Social Network.........37 
Figure 14. An Example of a Less Centralized Social Network.37 
Figure 15. Average Closeness-Centrality Versus 
Distribution Factor.............................38 
Figure 16. Penalty Assessed to the Reward Signal from 
Straying from the Agents Normal Beliefs.........42 
Figure 17. Application of Belief Revision Penalty..........42 
Figure 18. Graphs Showing Increasing Belief Revision 
Penalty.........................................45 
Figure 19. Overview of Using Genetic Algorithms to Breed 
Effective Social Network Agents.................49 
Figure 20. The Genes of the RL Algorithm by Generation.....50 
Figure 21. Statistics on the Lambda Gene in the  First 
Three Generations...............................51 
Figure 22. Overview of Outbound Trust Algorithm Within 
Cultural Geography..............................56 
Figure 23. Initial Results of Public Commodity in Cultural 
Geography Showing PC Contributions Over Time by 
Agent and Agent Satisfaction....................57 
Figure 24. Layered Approach to Trust Decisions.............62 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CG - Cultural Geography 
GA – Genetic Algorithm 
HSCB – Human Social, Cultural and Behavioral 
ML – Machine Learning 
M&S – Modeling and Simulation 
PC - Public Commodity 
PD – Prisoner’s Dilemma 
RL - Reinforcement Learning 
TRAC – TRADOC Analysis Center 
TRADOC – Training and Doctrine 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Without the constant source of motivation and guidance 
that I found in LTC Jon Alt I would never have been able to 
finish this project.  He always seemed to know exactly when 
I needed to be pushed and when I needed time to get things 
moving on my own.  Thank you Jon! 
I would also like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Chris 
Darken.  He allowed me the latitude to undertake a fairly 
difficult thesis project and work on it independently so 
that I had the freedom to really express my inner 
creativity.  Thank you, Chris! 
During my research, I always received ample support 
from TRAC-Monterey.  In particular I would like to thank 
Harold Yamauchi and MAJ Francisco Baez who both took the 
time to help me learn and understand Cultural Geography 
model and were indispensible parts in the success of this 
project.  Thank you Cisco and Harold and everyone at TRAC-
Monterey! 
There were many NPS students who I owe a big thanks to 
yet to thank them all would take all the pages in this 
thesis.  Therefore, I will simply say thank you to those who 
specifically contributed in some way to this project: Ozkan 
Ozcan, Dan Mckaughan, Rob Zaborowski, Tommy Getty and all my 
colleagues at NPS.  Thank you all!   
Without the tremendous resources of the MOVES and NPS 
faculty and staff, there was absolutely no way I could have 
completed this work.  In only brushing the surface of the 
creative depths of these individuals I have learned more 
 xiv 
about Modeling and Simulation than I ever imagined possible.  
All I can say is that I stand in awe at the talent that is 
here at MOVES and at NPS.  Thank you all! 
Lastly, I would like to thank my wife and kids for the 
love and support they provide.  To each of them I also want 
to say thank you for the sacrifices they make to help defend 
this country, from moving around every two years to having 
to watch their dad or husband sail off for the far side of 
the world.  To each of them I say thank you and I love you!     
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF MODELING TRUST 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Social simulation, and in particular human behavior 
modeling, has become an extremely important element of 
modern warfare.  This thesis is an attempt to solve one 
small piece of the problem of modeling human behavior by 
answering the following question: 
How can trust formation be modeled within human, 
social, cultural and behavior (HSCB) based 
simulations? 
In answering this broad question, it was necessary to 
answer several related questions.  These questions are: 
What is an appropriate working definition of 
trust as it applies to HSCB models and in 
particular agent communications within these 
models? 
What trust based effects do we expect to see from 
a properly implemented trust model within HSCB 
applications? 
Recent advancements in human behavior modeling, 
cognitive agent simulations and artificial intelligence have 
made the goal of predictive HSCB modeling attainable in the 
foreseeable future.  In the last ten years in particular, it 
has become possible to begin tackling the individual 
problems that are the stepping stones in achieving this 
modeling and simulation goal.  This research is directed 
specifically at the problem of modeling trust formation in a 
society and how it effects communication within that 
society.  If a society can be successfully modeled, 
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including accurate human behavior models, it may become 
possible to understand how insurgencies form and operate.  
Being able to predict the actions of an insurgency or even 
being able to prevent it from ever forming will be an 
immeasurably powerful tool in modern security and stability 
operations. 
The problem of modeling a society and more importantly 
of modeling an insurgency within that society is one of 
understanding political power.  Political power stems 
directly from the will of the populous and their opinions of 
those wielding the power (regardless of whether the power is 
implemented through fear or through proper civil discourse).  
The ebb and flow of political power is directly related to 
the communications that take place within that society, or 
more accurately how information is disseminated through the 
social network of that society.  Within social networks is a 
flow of information that begins with either an individual or 
a group and is transmitted to others with whom they have 
ties. The recipients of this information will make a trust 
evaluation in order to determine whether the information is 
actionable.  Information that is trusted can be used by the 
recipient in several ways.  Primarily, the recipients will 
adjust their beliefs based on this new piece of trusted 
data.  In some cases, the information that is received is 
something that the recipient feels his closest friends 
should also know about, and he can then resend this 
information further into the social network.   
It is easy to see how simple person-to-person 
communications are the building blocks of information flow 
in a society.  Furthermore, modeling the flow of information 
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is the most fundamental step in modeling political power in 
a society.  The particular problem addressed within this 
work is how best to model a system by which agents in a 
social network can evaluate information that they receive 
and how they can determine who in their local group of 
agents are trusted enough to receive this new piece of 
information. 
In the following section, there is a further 
exploration of the problem of trust modeling, including a 
discussion of why it is important to develop these kinds of 
models. 
B. EXPLORING THE PROBLEM 
When viewed at the national level, the objectives of 
warfare have never significantly changed for as long as 
there have been wars in society.  Carl von Clausewitz said 
in his unpublished treatise On War, “The political object is 
the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can 
never be considered in isolation form their purposes” (1832, 
p. 87).  In other words, the motivation to go to war is 
political in nature and therefore combat is just another 
means of achieving political ends.  In conventional warfare, 
the forces involved are typically evenly matched and the 
conflict is resolved by means of kinetic combat until the 
forces decide to cease this action usually by means of a 
treaty or surrender.  In the 21st century, the United States 
has developed a nearly unmatched military power in 
conventional kinetic ability.  This power encourages the 
enemies of the United States, especially those that are 
nongovernment actors, to resort to insurgencies and 
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nonconventional methods rather than meeting the United 
States in open combat (Department of the Army, 2006).   
The new flavor of warfare is one in which a 
technologically and numerically superior force is engaged 
with an inferior one that is willing to resort to insurgent 
and terrorist tactics.  The United States’ policies when 
involved in foreign internal defense are designed to protect 
the population of the host nation, as well as aid in dealing 
with insurgencies and other opposing forces that would 
prevent the development of an independent and free nation 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004).  The ultimate nature of 
warfare itself has not changed in that in these operations 
the U.S. still seek to win and use political power.  In 
conventional warfare, it is the choice between capitulation 
and combat that drives a nation to submit to the will of 
their opponent.  In recent wars, such as in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it has been found that kinetic military force 
alone is not enough to gain and wield political power.  If 
the U.S. is to allow these nations to build themselves up in 
the ways that they see fit in order become a free and 
independent, it simply cannot be done by sheer force alone.   
Following major military operations such as in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, there is a likely to be a much longer period of 
stabilization and rebuilding.  It is during this time that 
to find success a legitimate government that is widely 
supported by the populace and capable of dealing with 
counterinsurgents on its own must be established.  It is 
also during these beginning times that the counterinsurgency 
has the best opportunity to undermine this goal.   
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When dealing with kinetic operations, the efforts in 
modeling and simulation dealt mostly with the objective 
elements of the problem.  It is easy to model how a shell 
from a tank is going to travel and what kind of damage it 
could do to an enemy tank.  It is also well within the 
capability of modeling and simulation (M&S) to model 
conventional warfare through simulation and analysis using 
fairly straightforward laws of military conflict.  The 
reason these types of problem paradigms are well understood 
and easily modeled is that there is little human cognition 
involved.  Modeling insurgencies and public opinion has very 
little to do with physics and concrete laws and rather has 
everything to do with modeling the human mind.  Modeling an 
insurgency requires an understanding of the changing 
motivations of the insurgents and of the population in which 
they are hiding and operating. 
Understanding the complexities of human behavior is 
still in its infancy.  Furthermore, looking at a socially 
connected system of human beings and allowing them to freely 
interact makes modeling the behavior of that system even 
more difficult.  Take as an example the U.S.-led coalition 
force conducting stability operations in Iraq. If the 
military decides to improve the roads in the city, it would 
be of great advantage to the populace.  However, if an 
insurgency group does nothing more than spread rumors that 
the coalition force’s intentions are not to benefit the 
population but rather to ease their own military vehicle’s 
travel through the city, the popular sentiment may turn 
against coalition forces.  If the insurgents then destroy 
some of the roads and possibly even kill contractors 
building the roads it may end up fueling hostility toward 
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the coalition.  In this situation, military commanders will 
be faced with troubling dilemmas.  They will have to decide 
if it is best to conduct operations against the insurgency, 
such as searches and arrests of those involved, or will it 
be more beneficial to rebuild the roads, or will it be 
better to move onto another public works project.  They will 
have to know if it is better to try and sway public opinion 
by interacting with the populace or if it is better to go 
through city officials.  In order for the U.S. to make 
justifiable decisions in the situations described above, it 
is necessary that leaders be given tools that can aid in 
those decisions. 
The actions taken by the U.S. during stability 
operations will have broad and far reaching consequences.  
This work is attempting to further development models that 
can track how particular actions might sway public opinion.  
The type of HSCB model that this work is applicable is one 
in which the agents within the model are connected in some 
kind of social network within which information can flow, 
e.g., the Cultural Geography (CG) model developed by TRAC-
Monterey, which will be discussed in detail in a later 
section.  When agents in the social network witness an 
event, they will form some kind of opinion and may choose to 
share this information with its closest neighbors.  The key 
to modeling this information flow is in understanding the 
processing mechanisms of the individual agents.  The 
particular goal of this work is to model the trust decision 
that agents make when they receive information and also the 
decision of who to trust enough to resend vital information 
on to.  In the following sections there are more complete 
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discussions of the particular methodologies employed in 
modeling these trust decisions.     
C. METHODOLOGY 
This research uses Reinforcement Learning (RL) 
algorithms for modeling trust.  The trust algorithm was 
first implemented in a standalone simulation intended to be 
a vastly simplified version of the Cultural Geography (CG) 
model.  Following initial testing it was then transitioned 
to the CG model for full scale test and evaluation.  In 
later sections there will be in depth introductions to both 
RL and CG.   
The first step in the development of a successful trust 
algorithm was to build an extremely scaled down test bed 
that mimics some of the social networking behavior of the CG 
model.  This was done by modeling a simple social network of 
agents and applying modern social network analysis to see 
how the network evolves and how the agents communicate.  
Once an operable test bed social network simulation was 
developed, the trust algorithm was implemented and the 
agents were made to play trust games.  In particular, the 
economics based game called Public Commodity (PC) was used 
in our analysis, which will also be discussed in depth in 
later sections. 
The results of testing the trust algorithm with the PC 
game led to several revisions until a satisfactory outcome 
was reached.  At this point the trust algorithm was 
transplanted into the CG model.  A similar game of trust was 
developed within the CG model to test this early 
implementation of the algorithm.  
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II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This section provide background information that is 
needed to develop a RL based trust algorithm as well as 
relevant background information needed to test the algorithm 
with the CG model using the PC game. 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 
The first rule of simulation is to know what is being 
simulated.  If you want to draw an 800-pound gorilla, you 
must first know what an 800-pound gorilla looks like.   
Trust is a concept that is easy to talk about casually 
but extraordinarily difficult to define specifically.  This 
is especially true when it must be described in precise 
terms that can lead to a useful computer algorithm.  The 
concept of trust is important to a very broad spectrum of 
academic disciplines including psychology, sociology, 
philosophy, computer science, political science, and much 
more.  Certainly, there are no one-size-fits-all definitions 
for trust.  Therefore, in order to establish a useful 
working definition of trust one must first be careful to 
define exactly how it will be used and in what context it 
can be graded.  For this work the following definition of 
trust will be used: 
Trust = The perception of one agent (trustor) 
that other agents (trustees) will adhere to an 
unspoken social contract and will faithfully 
conform to preconceived actions based on their 
past actions, perceived characteristics or 
position in the social hierarchy. 
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The motivations for the definition of trust will be 
outlined in the following sections.  The ultimate goal for 
this project is the implementation of a trust based filter 
within the CG model, which is an agent based simulation 
currently being developed by TRAC-Monterey.  Therefore, the 
first subjects that must be discussed are the basics of 
agent modeling and communication and how trust affects 
communications. 
1. Agent Communications and Trust 
Agent based modeling can most simply be described by 
being made up of a group of agents that each receive 
percepts and take actions.  These agents base its actions on 
those percepts as dictated by its internal set of rules and 
processes.  The process of perception and action can be seen 
as a cyclic process between the agent and the environment, 
especially when all the other agents are viewed as part of 
the environment instead of actors within it.  This cyclic 
relationship is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.   A General Agent Model 
If we treat the other agents as part of the environment 
then the communications that are received from those agents 
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can be treated in exactly the same as percepts from the 
environment.  Looking at it in this way, we see how a 
general model of agent communication should look.  Figure 2 
shows a communication that is passed on from one agent to 




Figure 2.   General Trust/Communication Model 
In the simple model above, the overall communications 
process is complicated by the existence of many similar 
agents operating simultaneously within the same environment.  
In the example of the telephone game, each agent in the line 
of communication must accurately receive and then retransmit 
the information.  As soon as one agent in this link fails, 
the information is changed.  The evolution of the message 
driven by individual mistakes can lead to hilarious results, 
which is why the telephone game is so much fun to play.  In 
contrast to the telephone game, real societies have lines of 
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communication that are not linear.  Real communications 
within social networks transmit by taking multiple routes 
and therefore it is likely that important pieces of 
information that transmit through the entire social network 
will be received and retransmitted many times over by each 
agent.  Despite this redundancy of communication, the 
particular processes that the individual takes to receive, 
process and retransmit communications are the foundation of 
information flow in the network.  In models such as CG, the 
flow of information in the social network is the prime mover 
for agent belief revision, and therefore understanding the 
communication process is of vital importance.  The following 
section contains an in depth introduction to the CG model. 
2.  The Cultural Geography Model 
The Cultural Geography model is a discrete event 
simulation developed in Simkit that comprises a small 
society of agents that are seeking basic commodities for 
living such as water, fuel and food.  As these agents 
acquire these needed items, they can experience shortages or 
long queues that can influence its beliefs and therefore can 
drive some of its actions.  In particular, shortages in 
commodities may drive an agent to discuss its views on the 
situation with its neighbors.  As a parallel to the real 
world, if there were shortages of gasoline, and high prices 
and long lines where gasoline was available, this would 
certain be a center of many conversations.  In addition to 
dislike of the situation, people are also likely to express 
dissatisfaction for the current administration and how it 
might be their fault for the current shortage.  In addition  
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to commodities, the agents can also witness events such as a 
terrorist attack that can also affect its beliefs and become 
a topic of conversation. 
The agents each have a belief structure encoded as a 
Bayesian network that defines the agent’s issue stances.  
The point of this model is to monitor issue stances, such as 
positive feelings toward coalition forces, or satisfaction 
in the government.  As the simulation progresses the flow of 
commodities, or certain events will have an impact on the 
issue stances of the population and these effects can be 
tracked and analyzed. 
Trust in this model falls primarily into the area of 
inter-agent communications.  Simplifying this a bit, we can 
say that the agents will communicate with each other, update 
its beliefs, then, based on the updated beliefs take some 
actions.  The choice of who to trust guides the agent in 
updating its beliefs, which in turn guides the actions of 
the agents and therefore will have a direct impact on the 
happiness of the agent. 
The implementation of trust in CG will have an effect 
on all aspects of the simulation.  In order to weed out non-
trust phenomena and really see the effects of trust, we will 
be allowing the agents to interact in trust based economic 
games, such as the public commodity game.   
In parallel with the development of this algorithm, the 
CG model underwent a major overhaul with the addition of a 
cognitive architecture.  The agents utilize a working memory 
that can take a sequence of percepts, limited to a specific 
number, typically 7 percepts simultaneously.  These percepts 
lead the agent to form a cognitive determination of its 
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situation based on preplanned characteristics.  These 
characteristics include things like basic human needs and 
potential opportunities.  It is from this situation 
formation that the agents can determine the most appropriate 
action to take.  
The trust algorithm being developed within this work is 
based on RL, which relies heavily on the identification of 
the particular state the agent finds itself in.  In the case 
of inter-agent communications, the state could be as simple 
as the sender of information or could be much more 
complicated.  For example, the state could be a combination 
of the disposition of the sender, the sender’s name, the 
subject, the disposition of the receiver, and more.  
Unfortunately, the more complicated the state space becomes 
in RL, the longer it takes the algorithm to converge to an 
optimum.  There will be more discussion of the determination 
of states in a later section.   
In addition to knowing what state the agent is in, an 
RL algorithm must also have a method for mapping certain 
states and actions to rewards.  The CG model contains a 
cognitive self-appraisal that can be used as a reward 
signal.  The drawback here is that this method of reward 
does not specifically address the issue of trust, only the 
agent’s overall well-being.  Rewards are easily defined for 
games where the reward structures are built directly into 
the game’s rules.  Before returning to the goal of defining 
trust, there is first an introduction to the trust based 
games that these agents will play to test the trust 
algorithm. 
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3.  The Public Commodity and Economic Games of Trust 
The Public Commodity Game (sometimes referred to as the 
Public Trust or Public Goods game) is a very common test bed 
within the Game Theory and Economics communities.  The rules 
of the game are simple, although several variants do exist.  
This section will focus on the particular variant used in 
development of this trust algorithm. 
The PC game starts with a group of players.  In each 
round, every player is given an amount of income with which 
to play, 100 units, for example.  The player will then 
decide a portion of that money, ranging from no contribution 
to full contribution, to put into a public commodity.  The 
public commodity is meant to represent some kind of public 
good that benefits from cooperation en-masse, such as civil 
services (fire, police, hospitals, etc.).   
Other variants of the public commodity game include 
versions where the play must be either all or nothing, 
giving us two broad categories of players, contributors and 
defectors.  Although total defection is not allowed in this 
model, social defection is fundamental to the development of 
a meaningful definition of trust.  Because of this, the term 
defector will not be used for a player that completely opts 
out but for one who is taking advantage of the group by 
merely minimizing his contribution.   
After each player has contributed his selected amount 
in the blind, the total pot is then multiplied and then 
redistributed equally amongst all players regardless of its 
initial contribution.  The following shows the steps played 
in each round of the PC game: 
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1. Each player receives 1.00 units of commodity 
(utility) each round. 
2. Players have the chance to communicate once per 
round with close neighbors, including both sending 
and receiving information.  
3. The information transmitted between players does 
not directly pertain to the PC game, rather 
communications were about beliefs that indirectly 
contributed to a players decision on how much to 
contribute. 
4. The public commodity is collected once per round, 
multiplied by 3.0 and redistributed. 
5. Players are not allowed to know the contributions 
of the other players, nor did they explicitly know 
how many players are involved in the game. 
In this version, the payout to each player is private 
(i.e., no communications regarding payouts).  The agent’s 
contribution strategies, therefore, will be based on trust 
of the other agents in general, not based on trust of 
declared contributions.   
Looking at the PC game from a theoretic standpoint, we 
see that if the pot is multiplied by any factor greater than 
1.0, it is clear that the most mutually beneficial strategy 
would be for all players to commit all of its income to the 
pot.  This situation is an unstable state because any 
defector from this mutually beneficial strategy will 
individually benefit from opting out of a contribution.  In 
the case of a large number of players, each player will 
receive nearly the same public commodity payout, except the 
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defector in that without having had to pay into the pot he 
is now richer than the others by that contribution amount.  
The defector now has no monetary motivation to reinstate his 
contribution.  As the game progresses, more and more players 
begin to opt out and eventually the pot lowers in value.  As 
the pot lowers in value, many additional players will begin 
to opt out as they perceive the game to not be worth as much 
as they feel it should be based on past experience.   
As a game of pure strategy, the only stable equilibrium 
will be when all players opt out.  Look at the case where in 
a given round, there were no contributions from any player.  
In subsequent rounds, any single player that choses to begin 
contributing will find his contribution returned 
substantially reduced as it is divided up amongst all the 
other players.  This negative reinforcement will urge the 
player to once again defect from the game, returning the 
stable equilibrium of zero contributions. 
When PC games are used on real players in the 
laboratory, there are consistently higher payoff levels than 
what would be predicted within game theory (Hoffman, McCabe 
& Smith, 1998).  Based on the results seen in experimental 
economics, it is expected that the average dividend will 
approach a small but non zero value.  
Take, for example, a large social network of players, 
such that there is a sufficiently large population of 
players so that direct communication between all players is 
impossible.  In the language of network theory, this social 
network will have a relatively low ratio of average 
closeness-centrality to the total number of nodes in the 
network.  As an example, take a city of 250,000 people — any 
 18 
one person is likely to have direct communication with 
between 130 and 250 people, but typically cited is 150 as a 
good representative value (Dunbar, 1996).  There will also 
be a high degree of overlap; in other words, given any two 
persons in close contact with each other, their combined 
group of close neighbors will not be closer to 150 than 300.  
In other words, many of the 150 friends of each of these 
individuals will be the same as the other.  From these 
relationships comes the age-old axiom of “Six Degrees of 
Separation,” where even in a large population nearly all 
individuals are connected by six or fewer indirect 
relationships.  When this kind of group is examined within 
the PC scenario, it is expected to initially find a trend 
toward little or no contribution, but then it is expected to 
see close groups of individuals changing their contributions 
nearly at the same time.  What one should expect from an 
accurate model of agents playing a PC game is that trust 
groups make decisions nearly at the same time and as a whole 
change their contribution to the game.     
4. Getting Back to the Issue of Trust 
Trust is more than a prediction of an agent’s actions 
based on their past actions.  In the PC game, an agent will 
develop a trust of the other agents based mostly on the past 
performance of the public commodity in general, rather than 
the specific actions of any one player.  In other trust 
games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), the trust 
decision is likely not entirely based on reputation.  In the 
PD game, two players make a decision, usually pertaining to 
the confession of a crime, in which betrayal of their 
partner could stand to bring them reward.  Additionally, if 
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both players opt out of betraying the others then they will 
receive some smaller reward.  For example, if neither 
confess, they both get one month in jail, if one confesses 
and the other does not, the confessor may be set free and 
the other spends a year in prison. And, if they both 
confess, they both spend a year in prison.  In particular, 
what is being asked is if the opposing player(s) will adhere 
to some unspoken rules or a code of conduct.  These rules 
depend highly on the relationship of the players as well as 
the value of the objects involved.  As an example, look at 
the story “Button, Button,” by Richard Matheson, in which a 
strange man gives an unsuspecting person a box with a big 
red button.  If the button is pressed, the owner of the box 
receives a million dollar prize, but somewhere a stranger 
that they could not possibly ever know will fall dead.  This 
is the kind of situation wherein the social contract would 
dictate that the contestant should not press the button.  
This concept of a social contract is central to the notion 
of trust (Mistzal, 1996).  
When human beings in modern society view each other and 
make trustworthiness evaluations, there is clearly more than 
reputation involved in the decision process.  There will 
always be a constant baseline trust that exists between 
individuals.  This baseline will include such things as the 
potential trustees position in society, such as doctors and 
police officers, who garner automatic trust amongst most 
people.  The baseline will also include unconscious biases 
such as racial biases that make us inherently trust people 
who appear to be similar to ourselves (Stanley et al., 
2011).   
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In summary, what we have is a concept of trust that can 
be used to help predict the actions of other agents (such as 
their possible contribution to a public pot) and help to 
guide the actions of the trustor.  This trust will be based 
on three key elements, reputation, characteristics and 
position of the trustee.  These characteristics lead to the 
definition of trust being used in this research. 
B.  MACHINE LEARNING 
As the goal for this project is to model trust in a 
small group of cognitive social agents in a computer 
simulation, it is necessary to dive into the subject of 
machine learning (ML) and how it played a central role in 
the development of trust algorithms. 
1. Reinforcement Learning 
The particular brand of machine learning utilized in 
this project is reinforcement learning (RL).  RL is an 
appealing approach in that the very idea of reputation is 
built right into it.  Additionally, RL has been shown to be 
a fantastic tool for solving problems and captures many of 
the reinforcing phenomena that occur naturally in the human 
brain.   
The basic idea of RL is that agents will seek to select 
actions within their environment based on their experience 
and learn from those selections. Based on the permissiveness 
of the environment, agents are eligible to receive percepts 
from the environment that inform them on the state of the 
environment at a given point in time. The basic elements of 
reinforcement learning are: a policy that maps states to 
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actions; a reward function that maps a state of the 
environment to a reward; a value function that maps states 
to long term value given experience; and an optional model 
of the environment. The policy provides a set of actions 
that are available in a given state of the environment; the 
agents leverage its prior knowledge of the environment, 
informed by the value function, to determine which action 
will provide the greatest reward, as defined by the modeler.  
Agents must strike a balance between exploration, behavior 
to explore the reward outcomes of state action pairs that 
have not been tried, and exploitation, behavior that takes 
advantage of prior knowledge to maximize short term rewards, 
in order to avoid converging to local minima (Sutton & 
Barto, 1998).  The ability to control this balance makes 
reinforcement learning an attractive approach for 
representing human behavior. The reinforcement learning 
technique used in this work is Q-learning in conjunction 
with a soft-max function (the Boltzmann distribution). 
2.  Q-Learning Using Boltzmann Selection 
The basic reinforcement equation of Q-Learning is as 
follows in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3.   Q-Learning Reinforcement Equation. 
Q-learning falls into a class of model free 
reinforcement learning methods that have the property that 
the learned action-value function, Q, approximates the 
optimal action-value function, Q*, requiring only that all 
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state action pairs be updated as visited (Sutton Barto 
1998).  For each state action pair, (s,a), the Q-learning 
function updates the current estimate based on new 
information received from recent actions, r, and discounted 
long term reward. In general, an action is selected from a 
given state, the reward outcome is observed and recorded, 
and the value function updated.  The value associated with 
each action is used during each visit to a particular state 
to determine which action should be chosen using the 
Boltzmann distribution, shown in Figure 4 below.  
 
Figure 4.   Boltzmann (Soft-Max) Selection Probability 
The Boltzmann distribution uses the temperature term, 
τ, to control the level of exploration and exploitation. A 
high temperature translates into exploratory behavior, a low 
temperature results in greedy behavior.  Although the 
algorithms presented here utilize constant temperatures, it 
has been shown that temperature scheduling is far superior 
to constant temperature methods (Ozcan, 2011). 
A good example of reinforcement learning is an agent 
that plays the game, “N-Armed Bandit.”  In this game, the 
agent is faced with a slot machine with n arms, where n is 
greater than 1 and can be as large as necessary to serve the 
purpose of the experiment: in this case, choosing n to be 2.  
The agent is made aware that the payout probabilities are 
fixed and necessarily unequal, although the RL algorithms do 
not require this information to function properly.  In other 
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words, each arm pays out at a different fixed rate.  It is 
easy to see how most humans would approach this problem, and 
this is typically how the RL algorithms handles it as well.  
Most would pull each lever a fixed number of times, say ten 
pulls each, and record the results.  If lever A hits 2 times 
out of ten, and lever B hit out 5 times out of ten, most 
human players would favor lever B in the next round of play.  
The amount the player would favor depends on his particular 
attitude and is something that can be controlled within RL.   
So, we say that our player will play 15 times on lever 
B and only 5 times on A, but then something unusual happens 
-lever B only hits 2 times and lever A now hits 4 out of the 
5 times.  Most human players would put this one back to step 
1 and play equal amounts the next few rounds to settle once 
and for all which lever is better.  For RL, this added 
reward from lever A adds to its likelihood of being chosen 
in a very precise, although probabilistic, way as discussed 
previously.  The advantage here is that the agent utilizing 
proper RL algorithms will find the optimum, where a purely 
greedy algorithm may not.  In fact, in many situations it is 
easy for a simple algorithm to find a local optimum that is 
not the global optimum.  RL algorithms, when properly set 
up, are very good at not getting foiled into local optimums 
and most often find the true global optimum.  More 
importantly, it is possible to configure these algorithms so 
that its search for the global optimum is very similar to 
human behavior.  RL is particularly well suited for dynamic 
repeated environments wherein measuring past actions against 
unexplored opportunities yields the best overall results 
(Dutt, 2011). 
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As previously discussed, the basis of trust likely has 
evolutionary motivations and is driven at its core by simple 
concepts such as reciprocation and reputation.  RL provides 
a fantastic platform for designing a trust algorithm, in 
that its fundamental processes are perfectly suited to model 
these concepts and therefore it is the best choice for the 
basis of a trust algorithm.  RL does, however, highly rely 
on its inputs in order to function properly.  In particular, 
it is up to the designer in RL to define what reward signal 
should accompany given states.  It is also up to the 
designer to define how percepts will combine to form a 
hashable state and possible courses of action that the 
algorithm can use to determine the action-value function.  
An overview of this is shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Overview of the Q-Learning Cycle 
There is a further discussion of reward signals and 
state formation in Chapter III.  For now, it suffices to say 
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that, even though RL can be demonstrated to be a useful core 
algorithm for trust modeling, there is difficulty in 
implementing this model in that for each situation we choose 
to implement it, we must determine complete mappings for 
reward signaling and state formation.  Fortunately, the CG 
model has a built in cognitive self-appraisal that can be 
fed into RL as a reward signal. 
C.  SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
In order to see the effects of trust on a society of 
agents, it is necessary to look at the society in a network 
format.  Social networks are interconnected groups of 
individuals represented by nodes on a network graph and 
connected by edges that represent social relationships 
primarily based on communication.  Within the social 
network, there are a few attributes that can be used to 
evaluate the overall character of the network.  These are 
defined below: 
Degree Centrality is a measure of the direct 
connections of a node.  The average degree centrality tells 
us how connected the individuals are in this social network.  
This factor depends on the particular social network that is 
being looked at.  For example, in a small village of 100 
people or fewer, chances are that each individual will have 
connections to nearly all the others as this is a very small 
tight-knit community.  In a large city, a person will likely 
have between 130 and 200 connections, with 7 to 12 close 
personal ties.  In the last case, the degree centrality that 
will be modeled into the network depends on what strength of 
social ties wished to be modeled.  It may be that only close  
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personal ties are included in the model, whereas simple 
acquaintances are not.  Degree centrality formulae are given 








Figure 6.   Degree Centrality Formulae. 
Betweenness Centrality is a measure of a node’s 
importance to information flow within a social network.  In 
other words, given a node, sometimes called a broker, which 
is the only connection between two other nodes that are each 
hubs with high degree centrality, then any information that 
flows between the two sub networks formed by the two hubs 
must pass through the broker node.  The broker node in this 
case has a high betweenness centrality.  Another way to 
think of betweenness centrality is as a measure of the 
fraction of shortest paths that pass through the node in 













Figure 7.   Betweenness-Centrality Formulae 
Closeness Centrality is a measure of how close a node 
is in a social network to all the other nodes by both direct 
and indirect connections.  The average closeness centrality 
of the network tells us how connected the network is where 
the maximum possible case is a social network in which all 
nodes are connected to all others.  Closeness centrality 




















Figure 8.   Closeness-Centrality Formulae. 
Clique is a maximal group within a network in which all 
the nodes in the group are interconnected.  The formation of 
cliques is an expected part of most social networks 
(Hallinan & Smith, 1989).   
Every social network is different and therefore we will 
not find that there are any single values that we would 
expect for any of these characteristics that apply to all 
social networks.   
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III. THE TRUST ALGORITHM IN DETAIL 
As discussed in previous chapters, we are working with 
a biologically inspired model of trust in which the effects 
of reputation and reciprocity are central.  This trust 
algorithm was developed first as a simplified model based 
loosely on Cultural Geography.  The simplified version is a 
social network simulation that was developed in the Python 
programming language using the NetworkX network analysis 
tool pack from Los Alamos National Laboratory.  The next 
sections are a detailed description of how the algorithm was 
developed as well as the results of test and evaluation.   
A.  REINFORCEMENT LEARNING AS A TOOL TO DRIVE DYNAMIC 
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
One of the archetypal game scenarios for which RL is 
perfectly suited is the “N-Armed Bandit” problem, as 
discussed in the last chapter.  In this game, the agent is 
faced with a series of actions that are state independent, 
which means that the payouts do not depend on the history of 
actions of the agent, or the state of the environment.  That 
is to say, the environment in which the agent operates is 
unchanging.  In the case of the n-armed slot machine, this 
means that the probability of hitting a jackpot never 
changes, whether it is the first or the millionth pull, 
whether the jackpot has just hit or has never hit.  
Therefore, the agent simply must choose which arm to pull.  
Thinking about how a human being would determine which arm 
is best, the agent can more accurately be said to select a 
strategy for a series of pulls.  This strategy might be 
something like, first pull each arm 10 times and see which 
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one pays out better.  Then, based on the payouts, start 
favoring one arm over the other.  After a long period of 
play, the agent will become fairly confident which arm is 
better and will play that arm nearly exclusively.  In 
simplified form, this just means the agent will choose what 
percentage of a series of pulls that go to each arm.  The 
percentage of pulls can be called the emphasis that the 
agent places on each of the arms.    
If we think of slot machine arms as connections in a 
social network, and the payoff as the benefit of spending 
time with agents on the other side of those connections, we 
start to see how this n-armed bandit problem can be 
generalized and used in social networks.  Essentially, the 
agent has a choice of his nearest neighbors in the social 
network that he can choose to place some emphasis.  It may 
be instructive to think of this emphasis as a fraction of 
the day (or week, or whatever time period is relevant) that 
he would like to spend with this other person.  Wanting to 
spend time with someone is not enough to garner a reward; 
the other person must also want to spend time with you.  The 
game now becomes a multiplayer integrated n-armed bandit 
game in which each of the agents will decide which of its k 
nearest neighbors it chooses to spend its time with, and 
specifically how much time to spend with each.  If two 
neighbors both choose to spend time with each other, then 
they will both receive a positive reward from this 
interaction.  When one neighbor wishes to spend time and the 
other does not reciprocate, then little or no reward is 
given.  It is left for future work to determine if and how 
to utilize the idea of negative rewards in this situation.   
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This model has been implemented and turned into a turn-
based simulation in which the agents and their relationships 
are represented by a single network graph with the agents as 
the nodes and their social relationships as the non-
directional edges, weighted by the mutual value of the 
relationship.  The value of the relationship is dynamic and 
calculated once each round.  It will be a combination of a 
base static value and a dynamic value that is controlled by 
the agents.  The static is based entirely on the concept of 
homophily ( ) (McPherson Smith-Lovin, & Cook 2001), in 
other words, that demographically similar persons associate 
more frequently. The homophily calculation is a simple 
Euclidean distance from the agents demographic 
characteristics.  In this simulation the agents have 
multiple demographic dimensions, including age, sex, race 
and others which have fixed constant values.  When two 
agents share a common demographic value, a demographic 
character score of 1.0 is inserted into the Euclidean 
distance formula and 0.0 if they are different.  The 
demographic character scores are squared, summed and the 
square root is taken.  This value is then divided by a 
normalization factor to make the maximum homophily value 
1.0.  For example, looking at the case of 3 demographic 
dimensions, we have two agents that have the following 
demographic characters, Agent1 = [Caucasian, 24–34 years, 
Male] and Agent2 = [Caucasian, 64+ years, Male].  For these 
agents the homophily calculation would be as in Figure 9 
below (where EH is the homophily value and δn are the 










Figure 9.   Sample Homophily Calculation 
The value calculated above will be the baseline 
emphasis between the two agents for the entire simulation 
run.  It is left for future work to determine a viable means 
of altering the baseline homophily.   
The dynamic portion of the emphasis is completely under 
the control of the agents involved ( ).  In the case of k 
completely connected agents, each agent has k-1 choices of 
neighbors with whom to spend time with.  Based on the 
emphasis the agents places on each relationship, it will 
receive some unknown reward from time spent with the other 
agents.  For every simulation round, each agent will choose 
to increase, decrease or maintain its contribution to its 
relationships with the other agents.  This contribution can 
be viewed as a fraction of time spent with the others in 
that it is represented as a floating point number from 0.0 
to 1.0 and such that the sum of all these components (i.e., 
the sum of all edge weights leaving the node representing 
the agent) always sums to 1.0.  At the end of each turn, the 
agent is rewarded based on the strength of its 
relationships, which only hold value if the emphasis on the 
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relationship is reciprocal with the other agent.  This 
reward takes the form in Figure 10 below: 
 
Figure 10.  Basic Reward Calculation 
In the equation above, the EAB terms are the emphasis 
value that A places on the relationship with B.  
Additionally, recall that the EH term is a homophily derived 
base emphasis between agents A and B that is based on the 
Euclidean distance of their demographic characteristics. 
This equation uses the minimum of the variable contributions 
from each agent.  In this way, it can more accurately be 
said that the variable portion is the fraction of time that 
the agent would like to spend with the other agent, but if 
this sentiment is not reciprocated, no reward is earned.  In 
fact, since the total emphasis is constant in this 
simulation, placing emphasis on an agent that does not 
reciprocate comes with an opportunity cost that can be seen 
as a form of punishment. 
The result of this basic model is the development of a 
simple dynamic social network. The network tends to become 
highly centralized around 1 or 2 agents.  In particular, in 
runs consisting of 50 agents, the final network graph 
consisted of nearly every agent with a strong connection to 
a single central agent with nearly no other connections 





Figure 11.  Highly Centralized Social Network 
This centralization of the social network is explained 
by the fact that the algorithm is based solely on one-on-one 
interaction and neglects any effects due to larger groups 
and also due to the fact that the homophily calculation is a 
Euclidean distance formulation.  One might expect that the 
best the network can do is to pair up into closest 
neighbors.  In other words, each agent finds the one other 
agent it shares the closest demographic characteristics to 
and places total emphasis on this one relationship.  Given 
the way that EH is calculated, this will likely never be the 
case.  This is mostly due to the fact that the RL algorithm 
is not trying to maximize utility for the entire network, 
which can easily be done by forcing this kind of pairing.  
Rather, the RL algorithm, or better yet, the RL algorithms 
are working on one direction of one edge at a time, 
independently of all others.  So, instead of optimizing the 
network it is competitively optimizing all the connections 
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simultaneously.  Optimization can also come in the form of 
an opportunity cost, which is to say that a relationship 
that is emphasized but not reciprocated is the same as 
taking a penalty, which is equivalent to what the agent 
could have received from emphasizing some other relationship 
that would have been reciprocated and thus produced its 
relationships both by emphasizing some and ignoring others.   
Due to the fact that the homophily calculation used in 
this case is a Euclidean distance formula, we can say that 
each demographic characteristic is like a linearly 
independent value that can be treated like a coordinate 
access in a Cartesian coordinate system.  In this case, the 
agent’s particular demographic characteristics can be seen 
as coordinates in a 5 dimensional space (due to the fact 
that there are 5 demographic characteristics).  Each agent 
can then be represented as a single point in this space.  As 
the network evolves and the agents optimize their network 
connections, the agents will effectively try to minimize the 
distance they must cover in the 5 dimensional demographic 
space in order to make their best relationships.  The group 
of agents, all represented by points in a 5 dimensional 
space, will work most smoothly together by forming 
relationships closest to the geometric center of all the 
points.  Whichever agent, or agents, occupies the point 
closest to this center will inevitably end up being the 
central agent, depicted as agent #6 in the simplified graph 
above.  Any deviation from this will clearly be less than 
optimal for nearly every agent involved (save the one 
exception of the central agent). 
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In order to solve the problem of excessive network 
centralization, it was necessary to consider the effects of 
cliques on the network.  There was a need to give the RL 
algorithms some benefit to forming a network that allowed 
the formation of cliques like the one shown in Figure 12.    
 
Figure 12.  An Example of a clique of three agents  
or 3-clique 
In the example above, there are three agents that form 
a tightly bound clique.  In other words, the three agents 
all place equal emphasis on all the relationships.  If the 
emphasis is equivalent to an amount of time desired to spent 
with the target agent, then in the case above, there should 
be extra time allotted simply due to the fact that it is 
likely that agent A will spend time with agents B and C 
simultaneously.  In other words, if agent A only has 1.0 
units of emphasis to dole out, the time spent mutually with 
B and C should not count twice.  However, the secondary 
reward from spending time with B and C together will not be 
the same as if the agent could spent equal time with B and C 
separately.  This simply suggests that time spent in a pair 
is ultimately more personally rewarding.  This is obviously 
not always the case in every relationship, but as an 
average, it is likely to mimic actual social interactions 
quite well.   
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The second order reward factors are based on the same 
reward function as used in the first order above.  In this 
case, the reward is reduced by dividing by a distribution 
factor and is subsequently squared in order to emphasize the 
importance of first order relationships.  For the case of 
agents A B and C above, the additional reward looks as in 
Figure 13 below: 
 
Figure 13.  Secondary Rewards in the Social Network 
Once the second order terms are added similar network 
properties to what we would expect to see in real social 
situations emerge; namely subdivisions into cliques, 
pairings and the exclusion of certain individuals from these 
cliques (Wellman, Carrington, & Hall, 1988).  Figure 14 
below shows a less centralized network than the previous 
example.  The effect is much more dramatic in larger social 
networks but significantly more difficult to visualize and 
in printed form, therefore only a small social network is 
shown.   
 
Figure 14.  An Example of a Less Centralized Social Network 
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We find that the parameter D is highly influential on 
the closeness-centrality of the social network in such a way 
that D can be used to tune this factor to fit with the 
network being modeled.  The distribution factor was varied 
and showed a fairly steep “S” curve (Figure 15) that was 
centered between D = 14 to D = 24.  There are several widely 
varying sources on what a real human social network should 
look like in terms of closeness centrality that range from 
0.20 to 0.60 (Krebs, 2002; Dekker, 2008).  Therefore, for 
the purposes of the remainder of this initial 
experimentation D = 18.4 is used in order to target the 
fractional closeness centrality to around 0.30.  The exact 
nature of these values is irrelevant for this initial model 
and only serves as a baseline for further work.   
 
 
Figure 15.  Average Closeness-Centrality Versus Distribution 
Factor 
It is obvious that these features are not intended to 
actually model the internal and external processes that form 
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real human social networks; rather, it is just a starting 
block.  This dynamic social network is a simple stage that 
roughly mimics the dynamics seen in real social networks and 
which allowed the development of a trust algorithm within 
it. 
B.  ADDING COMMUNICATIONS AND TRUST TO THE SOCIAL NETWORK 
Now that there was a functioning social network on 
which to operate, it was necessary to implement a 
rudimentary belief structure for the agents.  Each of these 
agents had a finite set of beliefs, five in this case, 
represented by a single floating point number from 0.0 to 
1.0.  These beliefs combine in a simple linear combination 
(i.e., each value multiplied by a weighting factor from -1.0 
to 1.0) to provide a single issue-stance, also as a floating 
point that ranged in value from 0.0 to 1.0.  For these 
purposes, the interpretation of these numbers to actual real 
world beliefs is irrelevant; it only mattered that the 
agents had some kind of belief structure that is roughly 
heterogeneous across the population.  The social network for 
this simulation is allowed to evolve, initially for 1000 
rounds for a simulation of 15 agents.  Once the network was 
stabilized, the agents began choosing topics of 
conversation. This choice was based on a probabilistic 
Boltzmann distribution. The agents discussed this topic with 
its k nearest neighbors with the caveat that any neighbor 
above the communication-threshold, set initially to 0.90, 
will automatically receive a communication and likewise any 
neighbor below the ignore-threshold, initially set to 0.10, 
will never receive one.   
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Initially, the communications consisted of each agent 
telling its closest neighbors exactly what its value was on 
a selected belief.  At this point, the receiving agent made 
a trust evaluation of the information received in order to 
determine the best action.  The receiving agents used a 
reinforcement learning algorithm to determine whether or not 
belief revision was merited.  The state space that the RL 
algorithm operated in is a pairing of subject and sender for 
the communication.  As an example, if agent A tells agent B 
that he feels belief 5 has a value of 0.75, the receiver 
agent, B will use “Agent A discussing Belief 5” as the 
unique identifier of this state.  As will be seen in the 
next chapter, for early implementation into CG it will be 
necessary to confine the state space to just the sender of 
the information.  Each state in the state space has 2 
corresponding actions, “Trust” or “Do not Trust.”  For 
information received and trusted, the agent will update its 
beliefs according to the new information and this will 
define their future actions.  The method of belief revision 
used was to simply shift the agents own belief in the 
subject of the communication 1/10 of the way to the value 
stated by the other agent.   
In order to utilize reinforcement learning in this way, 
it is necessary to define some concept of a reward that the 
agent will receive based on its beliefs and therefore 
directly related to its trust and belief revision 
mechanisms.  Our inspiration for a reward model was the 
Public Commodity (PC) game from experimental economics.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, within the PC game, each 
agent has an option to contribute some fraction of its 
income (1.0 per round) to a public pot of money each round.  
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Following the round, the money in the pot is multiplied by 
some amount (in this case 3.0) and then redistributed to 
each agent regardless of contribution.   
In the current model, agents are given 1.0 possible 
units to play such that an agent that contributes nothing is 
guaranteed a reward of at least 1.0 for opting out and an 
unknown reward ranging from nearly 0.0 to 3.0 for full 
contribution.  Game theory tells us that without cooperation 
the expected equilibrium for rational players would be 
exactly 0.0 contributions from all agents; in other words, 
all agents take the guaranteed 1.0 and opt-out of the public 
commodity all together.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, we expect that in reality some people would always 
contribute at least some small amount irrespective of their 
losses.  In order to simulate this, we have developed “Faith 
in the Public Commodity” as the issue-stance and is used to 
directly control the level of their contribution to the 
public commodity.  During each simulation round, agents 
communicate with one another and attempt to bring other 
agents closer to their beliefs. 
Now that there is a concrete idea of reward in this 
model, it is possible to begin applying a simple model of 
belief revision.  The agents will communicate and the 
information will either be trusted or distrusted.  Trusted 
information will cause the recipient to alter its beliefs 
some fraction of the distance between its starting belief 
and the value of the belief being told to it.  The effect of 
this style of communication and belief revision will result 
in a local optimum of play by all players.  Effectively, all 
the beliefs will average out until all players believe the 
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same things, then no further belief revision is possible and 
the game will become static.  This is highly unrealistic for 
two major reasons: 1) Changing a belief is not free, there 
are internal psychological costs to changing beliefs 
(especially those that are deeply ingrained in the 
believer).  2) Beliefs are not always constant.  One of the 
key features of CG, for which this algorithm is intended, is 
that events such as food shortage or terrorist attacks can 
have an effect on beliefs.  
In order to model a penalty for straying beliefs away 
from the agent’s normal beliefs, the following penalty 
(Figure 16) is assessed to the reward signal received by the 
agents each round. 
 
Figure 16.  Penalty Assessed to the Reward Signal from 
Straying from the Agents Normal Beliefs. 
In the above, the Belief Variance is a simple Euclidean 
distance measure from the agents current beliefs to what it 
started with at the beginning of the simulation.  The norm 
penalty is applied to the reward signal, by reducing the net 
dividend the agent can receive from the pubic commodity as 





Figure 17.  Application of Belief Revision Penalty 
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In the above equation, CA represents the contribution 
to the public pot from agent A and K represents the number 
of agents in the social network.  The following summarizes 
the way this PC game is carried out within this social 
network: 
1. Each agent first decides whether to raise, lower 
or maintain its social emphasis on each of the 
agents they are connected to. 
2. Each agent will then conduct communications with a 
selection of its closer friends that consist of a 
basic statement about their value of a specific 
belief.  (e.g., Agent A communicates to Agent B 
that it feels 0.72 about belief # 1). 
3. Each agent that receives a communication will then 
choose to either totally trust the received 
information or totally distrust it. 
4. Each agent that has chosen to trust a piece of 
received information will adjust that particular 
belief 1/10 of the way to the announced belief 
value in the communication. 
5. After communications and belief revision have been 
processed, each agent will take the appropriate 
linear combination of its beliefs to produce its 
single issue stance, “Faith in the Public 
Commodity,” which will be a single floating point 
number from 0.0 to 1.0. 
6. Each agent will receive 1.0 units of income and 
from that contribute to the public pot in the 
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amount equal to the value of its issue stance on 
“Faith in the Public Commodity.” 
7. After all contributions have been collected the 
money in the public pot is multiplied by 3.0 and 
divided amongst each player equally as the net 
dividend. 
8. Each agent will assess the norm penalty by taking 
the Euclidean distance of its 5 beliefs from the 
values it had at the start of the simulation and 
applying it to the equation shown previously. 
9. Each agent will reduce its net dividend by the 
value of the norm penalty as shown in the equation 
in Figure 15 to produce the adjusted net dividend 
which will in turn be used as the reward signal 
for the agents RL algorithm for trust.  (note: the 
trust RL algorithm is independent of the RL 
algorithm for network emphasis)  
What is surprising is that when the factor F in the 
NormPenalty equation is varied, there is no marked 
difference in the outcome of the simulation from a purely 
statistical point of view.  In other words, the average PC 
play, contributions and dividends do not change.  What is 
seen, however, is an interesting structure of PC play over 




Figure 18.  Graphs Showing Increasing Belief Revision Penalty 
What is seen in the above is the higher the factor F 
becomes, the more unstable the Public Commodity game is.  In 
other words, with a small norm penalty the agents will tend 
to find a stable equilibrium and remain there with fairly 
significant stability.  As F is increased, the stability is 
decreased.   
The intriguing thing is that this behavior appears to 
be similar to actual human interaction.  For example, if we 
look at a society there is a sense of a norm although it 
will really change over time it will remain fairly constant 
over small enough time periods.  In this society there will 
be people or factions that challenge the social norm causing 
brief unstable equilibrium away from the norm that seem to 
return to the social norm after some time.  Often this can 
be seen as an individual or coalition breaking from the 
social norm.  The concept of coalitions in economic game 
theory is well understood and is an expected outcome games 
such as this (Von, Neumann, & Morgenstern, 1944).  The level 
at which coalition behavior takes place in societies can be 
a tunable parameter of this model.  It should be pointed out 
however that this version of the trust algorithm utilizes a 
simple reward-penalty structure.  Implementing this model in 
CG, which has its own reward structure built in, makes this 
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feature very difficult to reproduce.  There will be more in 
depth discussion of this in the next chapter. 
C. TUNING THE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING PARAMETERS 
One of the issues in implementing RL algorithms is that 
there are a few parameters that are used to define how the 
algorithm functions.  There was a detailed description of 
these parameters in Chapter II.  To apply a RL algorithm to 
the CG model, there are a few things that must be taken into 
account.  The most important thing is that this model is 
intended to run for relatively small groups of agents up to 
about 300, and meant to run for relatively short periods of 
time depending on the specifics of the scenario.  These 
limitations are due to complexity and the limits of 
computing power available.  There is no perfect theory that 
will identify the best parameter inputs for a given 
scenario.  Additionally and more importantly there is now 
way to map human behavior directly to these input 
parameters.  This is due to the fact that every person and 
every situation is vastly different.  RL is not a perfect 
match for human problem solving and therefore our prime 
motivation in selecting inputs to the RL algorithm is speed 
of learning.  We sought to find inputs that would yield 
global optimums in the minimum amount of time.   
In order to optimize the inputs to the RL algorithm we 
developed a program that would allow a group of 100 agents 
to compete at the tasks identified above in the PC game.  In 
particular, we left the input parameters as individual genes 
in a genetic algorithm.  The population was allowed to play 
the PC game for 2000 rounds including a 300 round 
stabilization period.  During play the agents were only 
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allowed to communicate about every 5 rounds in order to 
approximately mimic the communications that go on in the CG 
model.  Each round the total utility of the agents was 
ranked and the bottom half of all agents lobotomized, in 
that their RL algorithms were stripped away.  New RL 
algorithms for these agents were inserted as a genetic cross 
between two surviving parents selected at random using a 
Boltzmann selection method were the agent with higher 
utility has the better chance of breeding.  In addition to 
this the agents had a 3% chance per gene of random mutation. 
The following is an example of this methodology also 
shown graphically in Figure 19: 
1. Start of the simulation: 30 agents are created 
with random values for their Lambda, Gamma, 
Default Utility and Temperature which are used to 
define the RL algorithm at the core of their trust 
and communications behaviors.   
2. Stabilization: These agents will be allowed to 
randomly communicate for 300 rounds which will 
give the social network enough time to stabilize 
from its initially random values.   
3. PC Game Play: Following the stabilization period 
the agents will continue communicating randomly, 
but will also be forced to play the PC game once 
per round for 1700 additional rounds. 
4. Ranking and Culling: At the end of the PC game 
play, the agents are ranked according to their 
total score (utility) in the PC game.  The bottom 
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50% of these agents are culled as they are poor 
performers and their genes are undesirable. 
5. Breeding: The remaining agents are then selected 2 
at a time for breeding.  The selection is random 
and is weighted based on the agent’s utility score 
from the PC play portion.  One of the culled 
agents is regenerated with genes randomly selected 
from each parent weighted by each parents utility 
score.  For each gene there is also a 3% chance 
that the gene will be from neither parent and will 
take on a new random value.  This process is 
repeated until the agent list is repopulated. 
6. Repeat: Steps 1–5 are considered 1 generation.  
For most processes very few generations are 
required, for this work 100 is used, just to be 
certain all the genes have reached stable values 






Figure 19.  Overview of Using Genetic Algorithms to Breed 
Effective Social Network Agents 
Allowing the agents to evolve for 100 generations we 
have found that some of our learning parameters form a 
pretty tight distribution, while others do not.  Those that 
do not, indicate that they do not have high importance in 
making these agents fast learners.  The results of the 




Figure 20.  The Genes of the RL Algorithm by Generation 
The first and most obvious result here is that the gene 
for Lambda or the learning rate in the model tends to be 
very high.  This indicates that the agents do not need a 
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very long memory in order to be successful in this model and 
look primarily at the most recent information.  Looking at 
the figures below, it can be seen how the Lambda gene 




Figure 21.  Statistics on the Lambda Gene in the  
First Three Generations 
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The other genes in this model all seem to fit only 
loosely into an optimum.  The Gamma gene seemed to show some 
population pressure to stay close to the range of 0.3 to 
0.5.  The other genes did not seem to come stable to any 
particularly tight grouping.   
Assuming the gene pool has roughly stabilized by 50 
generations, the remaining 50 generations were used to 
produce random agents for testing within the CG model.  The 
results of testing are discussed in the next chapter.   
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IV. APPLICATION TO CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 
Cultural Geography is an extremely complex model and 
there were changes to be made to the trust algorithm in 
order to fit it within the existing CG architecture.  In a 
typical simulation run there simply are not enough 
communications for the agents to have a state space that is 
two dimensional and inclusive of subject matter and sender.  
For this initial implementation, it was necessary to limit 
the state space to include only the sender and be completely 
independent of the subject matter.  In future versions, the 
subject matter will likely be brought back in, in such a way 
that will require the simulation to undergo an initial 
learning period prior to the actual simulation run.  More of 
this will be discussed in the future work section in 
Chapter V.  Additionally, the CG model is a discrete event 
simulation in which there are distinct and separate events 
for sending and for receiving communications.  These events 
occupy different portions of the code and therefore it was 
vastly simpler to develop separate inbound and outbound 
trust models.  In future versions, a method for linking 
these separate algorithms can be implemented. However, for 
this early version, no such link was developed.  Lastly, in 
order to help track trust development during future testing 
it was decided that a binary trust decision would not 
suffice.  In lieu of this, the agents choose to raise or 
lower a trust value each time a communication is sent or 
received.  The trust value, compared to a threshold 
determines whether or not a communiqué is to be trusted. 
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This will also allow future implementations to model the 
concept of trust as a floating value rather than a binary 
decision.     
A.  THE TRUST MODEL WITHIN CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 
As was discussed previously the process from going from 
the received percepts of the environment to the hashable 
state to be used in the RL algorithm is not able to be 
generalized and must be specifically implemented for each 
simulation this algorithm is used in.  For CG, the agent has 
an internal process that forms the current situation as 
described in Chapter II.  This trust algorithm is attached 
to CG at this point.  In particular, if the current 
situation involves the receipt of a communication, the trust 
algorithm is applied.  In the simplified test program, it 
was possible to use both the sender’s name and the subject 
as state variables; however, due to the complexity of CG, it 
is necessary to only use the subject at this time.  In 
addition to reducing complexity, it is also realistic to 
remove the subject from the state determination because in 
the observations of real human interactions, the subject of 
discussion does not often effect trust.  The person sending 
the information seems to have a much more significant 
impact.   
Within CG, the agents choice of actions are themselves 
based an RL algorithms.  The agents determine its state 
using a cognitive approach described in Chapter II and based 
on that make a choice of possible actions.  If the agent 
chooses to communicate, it is at this point that the 
outgoing trust algorithm is tied in.  The agent has a 
selection of its closest neighbors in the social network.  
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The algorithm will choose to trust the agents to receive the 
communication on an individual basis based on the trust 
level of that agent.  Prior to making the actual trust 
decision, the agent will choose to either raise, lower or 
keep constant the level of trust in each of the potential 
nearest neighbors with whom it may communicate.  These 
decisions are the result of an RL algorithm.    
One of the crucial pieces to developing a successful RL 
based algorithm is definition of a reward structure.  
Concurrently with the development of this trust algorithm 
was the development of a cognitive architecture.  The 
cognitive architecture allows the agent to receive percepts 
from the environment into the agents short term memory which 
contains a tunable limit to the number of percepts that can 
be simultaneously stored in short term memory.  Periodically 
the short term memory is evaluated and a situation is 
cognitively determined that tells the agent essentially what 
is going on in the world.  The agents then use this 
situation to determine motivation.  For example, in CG all 
the agents are commodity seekers, obtaining items such as 
food, water and fuel as they are needed.  If an agent has 
been without water for a while, its basic need for water 
will be at the forefront of his motivations.  The cognitive 
architecture also has a long-term memory that can give the 
agent a sense of how they are prospering.  The CG cognitive 
architecture provides a built-in function for agent 
satisfaction that is easily used as the prime reward signal 




Figure 22.  Overview of Outbound Trust Algorithm Within 
Cultural Geography 
B.  ATTEMPTING TO PLAY PUBLIC COMMODITY GAMES IN CULTURAL 
GEOGRAPHY 
In order to develop a simple enough PC scenario within 
CG and remain in the scope of this research project it was 
necessary to patch the PC game into an existing scenario.  
The scenario chosen was a simple model of 30 agents modeled 
after the population of the United States.  These agents 
will communicate for approximately 300 rounds with injects 
from the environment that are information pertinent to their 
national satisfaction. These injects include economic 
factors.  With the generalized nature of the algorithm being 
applied it is felt that the particulars of this model would 
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not affect the outcome of the trust algorithm.  Particularly 
if the national satisfaction was assumed to be equivalent to 
the faith in the public commodity, we can easily play the 
public commodity game within this model.    
C.  DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS   
The PC game within the CG model had similar results to 
early testing in the standalone version.  Figure 23 shows 
the individual agents PC contributions and satisfaction over 
the run of the simulation.   
 
 
Figure 23.  Initial Results of Public Commodity in Cultural 
Geography Showing PC Contributions Over Time by 
Agent and Agent Satisfaction. 
Both contribution and satisfaction are very tightly 
grouped, which is not a feature to be expected from a real 
population of individuals in a similar situation.  To 
understand what is going on here, recall that the 
contribution of the agents were identical to the issue 
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stance of national satisfaction.  What this graph shows is 
that with this scenario and this particular implementation 
of the CG model, all the agents in this scenario have very 
little difference in their beliefs.  This is likely due to 
the fact that the belief structure for this test case was 
very simple.  More significant than this however, is the 
likelihood that the agents can too easily change their 
beliefs.  Looking to the standalone data, it was not until a 
very sharp exponentially driven penalty function was applied 
to the model that realistic trust group formation began to 
occur.  There will be more discussion of this and other 







V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In summary, there were very promising results observed 
from the initial testing of the algorithm.  Applying this 
algorithm to the CG model produced less dramatic results, 
however has pointed to some obvious areas for improvement.  
In the following sections there are several recommendations 
for future work with this trust model. 
A.  FUTURE TESTING WITH TRUST GAMES 
The results of testing within Cultural Geography show 
that the agents too readily allow their beliefs to come in 
line with each other and thusly allow their contributions to 
nearly all be the same.  With such behavior, the game is not 
dynamic enough for there to be any trust formation.  
Additionally, the game is being played as if all the agents 
in the society are within one large trust group.  Without 
separate groups competing, there are no really good data 
from which to validate this model of trust within Cultural 
Geography.  This situation is strikingly similar to what was 
first observed in the standalone version.  Essentially in 
that instance all the players converged to the same beliefs 
and the same PC contribution.  When a significant penalty 
was added for changing beliefs, the model became far more 
realistic.  It is recommended that to test this algorithm 
further within CG, a more significant penalty be implemented 
for belief revision.   
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B.  GENETIC ALGORITHMS FOR IN-SITU MODIFCATION OF AGENT 
LEARNING 
It may also be possible to make the learning parameters 
of the agents self adaptive.  If we follow the same basic 
genetic algorithms approach described previously, we might 
find that the agents could be made to alter their own 
learning parameters to adapt to different environments.  The 
fundamental difference would be that instead of 30 
competitively bred agents, there would instead be 30 agents 
that are static that have multiple learning techniques 
applied internally.  For example, each agent would have 7 
different RL algorithms operating in its internals that 
would also give it up to 7 different possible courses of 
action.  The choice of which of these 7 to utilize can also 
be RL driven in a similar situation to a 7-armed bandit 
scenario, in that it is a stateless RL algorithm with a 
static set of possible actions.  This way, when an RL 
algorithm leads to poor performance, another one may be 
selected.  The 7 RL algorithms could periodically be culled 
and bred in order to take advantage of the benefits of 
genetic techniques.     
 C.  SITUATION IDENTIFICATION AND LAYERED APPROACH TO TRUST 
Due to the scarcity of communications in the average CG 
run, there is not a lot of time to allow RL algorithms to 
work and develop trust.  This is the primary reason why the 
state input to the RL algorithm for CG had to be limited to 
just the identity of the sender.  If the state were more 
complicated, learning behavior simply would not have enough 
time to find any sort of optimums in the state-action space.  
However, if an adequate method could be found to prime the 
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learning engines of these agents that would not be 
computationally untenable, the state space could be much 
more complicated and make the model much more realistic.   
Obviously the first item would be to bring back the 
subject of communications back into the trust decision.  For 
future work it would be useful to determine if the trust 
decision should be a single decision based on the sender-
subject as a single entity, or should it be two sequential 
decisions?  As a sequential decision is would be that the 
agent would first ask if they trust the sender and then if 
the sender is trusted, should they trust the sender to 
discuss the particular subject matter? 
The next level in adding complexity to the state space 
would be to allow all the perceptual information that a 
person would normally use to develop a notion of trust in 
others.  The need for this is clear when we have an 
established social network of agents and then we add a 
newcomer agent.  If that newcomer or stranger enters into 
conversation with an established agent, the initial trust 
decision can become an important part of social phenomenon.  
Therefore, it is not enough to just allow the RL algorithm 
to develop the sense of trust of this agent by its name.  
Rather, the agent’s physical (i.e., demographic) 
characteristics will play a huge role in the initial trust 
determination.   
The state space would be represented by a series of 
percepts of the received communication.  Those percepts 
could include the identity of the sender, the subject 
matter, and other characteristics including race, demeanor, 
appearance, age, apparent social status, or many more 
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possibilities.  The obvious problem is that if the state 
space is too complex, the probability that any two states 
the agents find themselves are the same would be small.  
Therefore, if we employ a standard single RL algorithm, it 
could take millions of interactions before the RL algorithm 
has located any optimums within which to operate.   
One possible way around the problem with overly complex 
state spaces would be to build a layered dynamic algorithm 
where the trust decision is a series of decisions.  The state 
space for each decision is based on a single characteristic 
just like proposed above where first we trust the sender and 
then the subject matter.  There is an added problem to this 
approach in that it is unrealistic to assume that this 
complex layered trust decision will be the same from the time 
an agent is first met to when they are an old friend and have 
been for 20 years.  These decisions do not have to be 
sequential.  In fact, they could be a combination of serial 
and parallel weighted decisions as shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  Layered Approach to Trust Decisions 
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As shown in Figure 24, the decision to trust could be 
based on a group of series and parallel decisions.  The 
pathways and weights of these decisions could modified based 
on utility gained from the agent, or could be based on how 
long and how often the agent is communicated with.  The 
updating of the pathways and weights could also be part of 
an RL algorithm in itself.   
As part of the layered approach to the trust decision 
we could also include some internal percepts.  This would 
allow the agents “emotional” state to possible effect its 
trust decision.  As an example, a real person who is feeling 
extremely happy and fortunate is likely to be far more 
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